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I. INTRODUCTION 
Tensions were high when the Supreme Court announced its decision 
in the long-awaited Bilski v. Kappos,1 a case expected to settle a dispute 
that had spanned more than thirty years2 over the proper method for 
determining the patentability of processes under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
Hanging in the balance were the futures of business methods patents, 
risk management patents, software patents, and other processes that 
skirted the bounds of 35 U.S.C. § 101.  Some speculated an end to 
 
1.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
2.  See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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software patents in the United States entirely.3 Others predicted 
clarification about the physical requirements of the “machine-or-
transformation test,” which had been determined by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the sole means for determining 
patentable subject matter for process patent applications.4  
Anticipations and expectations were high for some clarity on the 
prevailing questions about software patents.  Opponents to the existing 
system argued that current patentability standards were too broad, 
which overburdened the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
and hindered progress in e-commerce and other areas.5  Proponents said 
that the current system worked just fine, as evidenced by the United 
States being a global leader in technological innovation.6  What these 
interested parties got instead was little clarification on the machine-or-
transformation test, or on software patentability as a whole.  Rather, the 
Supreme Court confounded the debate by clarifying that the machine-
or-transformation test was one means for determining whether a 
proposed process patent was eligible for patentability, but not the sole 
test7 . . . oh and abstract ideas still cannot be patented.8  Obviously, this 
ruling fell considerably short of the paradigm-shifting ruling expected, 
and commentators on both sides of the software patent issue are in no 
better position than they were previously.  The resounding question 
remained—what is the definition of “abstract?”  It had long been 
established that algorithms, existing alone as mathematical formulae, 
were abstract,9 but where does that leave software, which relies on 
algorithms to function and transform data?  The Court reaffirmed its 
belief that Congress contemplated that patent’s scope would be broad 
and encompassing,10 while reiterating section 101’s outer bounds.11  The 
 
3.  David Worthington, In Re Bilski - The End of Software Patents?, SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT TIMES (July 8, 2009, 12:51 PM), http://www.sdtimes.com/ 
blog/post/2009/07/08/In-re-Bilski-The-end-of-software-patents.aspx. 
4.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“An argument can be made that 
the Supreme Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it 
either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a ‘different state or 
thing.’”) (emphasis added); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955–56. 
5.  Kevin Coughlin, Technology upends the meaning of invention Patent requests shift to 
ideas, know-how, THE STAR-LEDGER, March 12, 2000, at A1. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).   
8.  Id. at 3230. 
9.  See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
10. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221. 
11. Id. at 3225 (“[T]hree specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility 
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question further stood that, if software, which is classified as a process 
patent, must stand to subject matter muster, would it pass the machine-
or-transformation test?  Seeing as how the Supreme Court failed to rule 
definitively on the issue, if a software patent did not pass this test, would 
there be any other threshold for determining whether it was patentable, 
given the various tests hammered out by the circuit courts over the 
years?  Hovering on the outskirts of this debate is the fate of DRM, a 
heavily algorithm-based technology that currently enjoys patent 
protection.12  At the center of the nebulous DRM cloud is its most vital 
technological component, encryption.  It is this patented13 encryption 
technology that remains most vulnerable in Bilski’s wake, and its future 
could make or break the industry as a whole. 
II. THE SUM OF ITS PARTS: AN OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY14 AND THE RELEVANT LAW 
 
There really is no generally-accepted definition for “Digital Rights 
Management.”15  Put simply, DRM is the layering of both technological 
and legal means16 to prevent and discourage third parties from gaining 
unauthorized access to digital content.  The scope of DRM is very 
broad.  In their simplest forms, DRM systems act as copy-prevention 
systems by preventing, or at the least, impeding, consumers from 
copying digital content from various tangible sources, such as DVDs 
and CDs, cell phones, and eBook readers.17  In their more complex 
forms, DRM systems differ in scope, from facilitating diverse complex 
business models, such as pay-per-use18 systems, to secured 
 
principles: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”). 
12.  Greg Vetter, Patenting Cryptographic Technology, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 757, 759 
(2010). 
13.  Currently, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) uses the 
“380” numerical classification for patents in the general cryptographic class.  Id.  The 
USPTO’s website allows one to explore the various types of patentable subjects under each 
class.  Class 380 contains several subclasses of encryption claims. See Class 380 Cryptography, 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/patents/classification/uspc380/sched380.htm (last modified Aug. 11, 2011). 
14.  This section in no way attempts to explain, in any major detail, the technologies 
associated with DRM.  It is merely an attempt to summarize the technologies briefly, leading 
then into the more relevant topic of encryption. 
15.  Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 
AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 324 (2004) (hereafter Bechtold). 
16.  See infra A(3). 
17.  See Bechtold, supra note 15. 
18.  Pay-per-use models involve systems in which consumers pay for their individual 
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communication, such as wireless (Wi-Fi) networking and Bluetooth 
technologies,19 to secure distribution systems, such as music20 and video 
downloading/streaming,21 and secured web browsing, or even online 
transactions.  While the DRM systems that exist are multifarious, most 
share one common trait.  The common trait in these systems, and 
arguably the most important facet of DRM as a whole, is encryption.22  
Encryption is essentially the process of modifying data systematically, so 
as to make that data unreadable, while allowing for the data to be 
restored to its original state by an (in theory, anyways) authorized user.23  
The science of using secret codes or methods to prevent unauthorized 
reading of content is called “cryptography,”24 and is crucial to 
encryption. 
Cryptography is by no means a new science.  It has existed as a 
means for securing information for centuries, dating back to antiquity.  
Spartan commanders used a cipher system involving batons and paper, 
the combination of which was called a “scytale,” to encode messages.25  
Gaius  Julius Caesar communicated with his field generals during 
military campaigns with a relatively simple form of cryptography, the 
“Caesar Cipher,” in which the letters were shifted three places forward 
 
use of digital content.  Id. 
19.  Joseph Kashi, Hi-Tech in the Law Office: We’re all Confronted by the Mobile 
Security Sieve, 28 ALASKA BAR RAG  26, 27 (2004). 
20.  See Bechtold, supra note 15, at 327.  Though, the trend of using DRM encryptions 
on music sites is a trend that is falling out of favor.  See Christopher Breen, DRM-Free 
iTunes: What it Means for You, PCWORLD (created Apr. 7, 2009 12:50 PM),  
http://www.pcworld.com/article/162732/drmfree_itunes_what_it_means_for_you.html. 
21. See Tim Conneally, Hulu whips up its own DRM to block people from watching 
videos outside browsers, BETANEWS, http://www.betanews.com/article/Hulu-whips-up-its-
own-DRM-to-block-people-from-watching-videos-outside-browsers/1238697188, April 2, 
2009 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (detailing one such DRM system implemented by online 
video provider Hulu). 
22.  Bechtold, supra note 15, at 326 (citing Dean S. Marks and Bruce H. Turnbull, 
Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial 
Licenses, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 198, 204 (2000), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/wct_wppt_imp/wct_wppt_imp_3.pdf at 11  
(“Encryption of content is key for distinguishing clearly between authorized uses and 
unauthorized uses, especially in computer environments.  No individual or device can decrypt 
content ‘by accident’.  [sic] Hence, encryption is the keystone of current copy protection 
efforts.”) (emphasis added)). 
23.  See JOAN VAN TASSEL, DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 85 (2006). 
24.  KENNETH R. REDDEN & GERRY W. BEYER, MODERN DICTIONARY FOR THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 257 (2001). 
25.  Oliver Pell, A Brief History of Cryptography and Cryptanalysis, CRYPTOLOGY, 
http://www.ridex.co.uk/cryptology/#_Toc439908853.   
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in the alphabet.26  The commander in receipt of the encrypted 
correspondence would simply shift the letters backwards three spots in 
the Roman alphabet, and read the newly formed message.27  During the 
middle ages, European governments relied on coded vocabularies, 
called nomenclatures, to communicate sensitive diplomatic 
information.28  Allied success at capturing and breaking the German 
aptly-named “Enigma Machine” and its code, respectively, contributed 
greatly to the Allied victory in World War II.29  Historically, with new 
advances in technology, came the need for more advanced copyright 
laws.  This “intertwining” of technology and copyright, wherein the 
progress of the former demands expansion of the latter, has spiraled 
onward with the march of time, demanding new copyright protections 
with new advances in technology.30  But the story of cryptography in 
regards to DRM begins in the mid-20th Century.  The creation of new, 
more accessible content-copying technologies through the 1960s and 
1970s, such as copy machines, audio recording devices, and video 
recording devices, made it much easier for the average consumer to 
copy and distribute media and content, which rendered content-
producing industries all but helpless to enforce copyright protections.31  
This technologically-induced expansion of inexpensive means for 
dissemination of information paved the way for newer technologies to 
do the same for digital content preceding the turn of the century.32  As 
expected, these technological revolutions necessitated the expansion of 
the protections afforded to content producers.  What resulted was a 
partnership between industry-created technological protections—
DRM—and legislative expansion—the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act.33 
The first thing one must realize when examining DRM encryption 
technologies and DRM software is that while they both are considered 
synonymous, insofar as patentable subject matter claims (that being a 
 
26.  CHRISTOPHER SWENSON, MODERN CRYPTANALYSIS 2 (2008). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Bechtold, supra note 15.   
29.  See Jerry C. Russell, Ultra and the Campaign Against the U-Boats in World War II, 
(created Sept. 2, 1996 1:16 PM), http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/navy-1.html. 
30.  See generally Gary S. Lutzker, Dat’s All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1991 - Merrie Meldoies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT LJ 
145, 149 (1992). 
31.  See generally Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 
1145, 1220 (2000).   
32.  Id. 
33.  The DMCA is discussed in more detail infra (B)(3). 
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“process” or “method” patent claim), they are intrinsically different.  
While not all systems that fall into the DRM classification use 
encryption, encryption is the most common means of copy protection 
and the core technology most associated with DRM.34  Oftentimes DRM 
encryption technology is deployed via software.35  The algorithms that 
make up the bulk of encryption schemes are based in advanced 
mathematical concepts, and the difficulty of breaking these encryption 
schemes depend on the keylength and the system/software 
implementing the encryption.36  As time progresses and cryptographic 
research advances, new algorithms and new investors arise to put money 
into patenting new encryptions devices.37  It is of no surprise then that 
the increase in software patenting has directly led to a rise in the need 
for new cryptographic techniques.38  A DRM encryption device inventor 
will typically apply for a patent on his encryption technology as a 
“method claim,”39 which recites the series of steps that comprise the 
method.40  Thus, a patent application for a DRM encryption technology 
will be considered by the patent examiner as a process patent. 
A. Is for Algorithms 
1. Encryption: The Common Denominator 
The technology employed in DRM is vast and complex.41  A basic 
understanding of the encryption and decryption process is necessary 
before delving into the issues of patentable subject matter of these 
encryption devices.  Whether the technology is the type of DRM found 
on DVDs,42 downloadable music,43 or streaming digital content,44 most 
 
34.  VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 89. 
35.  Vetter, supra note 12, at 758. 
36.  VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 91–93. 
37.  Id. at 95.  
38.  Brian Spear, Cryptographic Patents: At War and in Peace, 22 WORLD PATENT 
INFO 177, 180–81 (2000).   
39.  For example, the HDCP encryption key patent. U.S. Patent No. 7,034,891 (filed 
Jan. 31, 2003). 
40.  Supra note 14. 
41.  This article will not attempt to explore the numerous and varied technologies 
involved in cryptology and DRM, but will instead focus on the common types of encryption 
schemes used in DRM, and more specifically, the encryption and decryption devices 
themselves.  To go any further into the technological wilderness would fill many books.  In 
fact, there are already some interesting writings on the more technical and mathematical 
aspects of DRM.  See e.g., Sommer, supra note 31; BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED 
CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C (1994).   
42.  Such as CSS. See VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 155. (Author’s note: CSS was not 
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DRM technologies employ patented encryption devices, or technologies 
that encrypt or scramble, using an algorithm, the digital content so that 
it is unreadable without the decryption key.45  Encryption is the most 
common means of copy protection, and is the core technology 
associated with DRM.46  The content-provider will then license, to 
device manufacturers, the encryption scheme, with the encryption and 
decryption keys necessary to first encrypt their content, rendering it 
unreadable, and then decrypt and thus access and display/play it.47 
Two common types of encryption schemes48 are “symmetric” 
encryption and “asymmetric” encryption.49  Symmetric encryption 
schemes, such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption, 
involve the encryption of data by one party, who then shares the key 
that decrypts it with the second party, who decrypts the data with that 
key.50  A second type of encryption scheme is an asymmetric or “public-
key” scheme.51  This type of scheme, such as RSA,52 is more complex.  In 
a public-key encryption scheme, each party has two keys—a public key 
and a private key.  One party sends his public key to the other party.  
The other party uses his private key in conjunction with the first party’s 
public key to encrypt the data.  The first party can then use his private 
key to decrypt the data.53 
 
patented. Robert Warren, et al., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) List § 2.11.2, OPENLAW 
DVD/DECSS FORUM,  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/dvd-discuss-
faq.html#ss2.11.2. 
43. See INTERNET USER IDENTITY VERIFICATION, http://www.pat-
rights.com/InternetUserIdentityVerification.html. 
44.  HDCP encryption key patent. U.S. Patent No. 7,034,891 (filed Jan. 31, 2003). 
45.  HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/encryption.htm (last 
visited March 22, 2012) (“But the most popular forms of security all rely on encryption, the 
process of encoding information in such a way that only the person (or computer) with 
the key can decode it.”); Thomas Claburn, Apple, Dell, Intel Sued Over Encryption Patents, 
INFORMATION WEEK (Mar. 31, 2009, 3:20 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/ 
news/global-cio/legal/216402041 (listing examples of encryption patents and the lawsuits that 
result).   
46.  VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 94. 
47.  See infra Section A(3). 
48.  “Schemes” should, for our purposes, be considered synonymous with 
“algorithms.”  Compare Schneier, supra note 41, at 11 with VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 94.   
49.  Schneier, supra note 41.    
50.   See supra note 47. 
51.  Id. 
52.  The RSA encryption was named after its creators, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and 
Leonard Adleman.  See RSA Algorithm, SEARCHSECURITY, (Aug. 1, 2000), 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/RSA.  For an excellent and easy-to-digest 
explanation of the algorithm, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b57zGAkNKIc. 
53.  Id.   
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DRM technology vendors have begun to realize the importance of 
selecting the right encryption algorithms and implementations.  
Symmetric-key algorithms are now popular for encrypting content.54  
Examples include RC5 and RC6 from RSA Security, Blowfish and 
Twofish from Counterpane Labs, and AES, the government successor 
to DES, which is based on a Belgian algorithm called Rijndael.55  Public-
key algorithms are still used for generating digital signatures and can be 
used to add further protection to symmetric-key algorithms, by 
encrypting them again.56 
These examples show the important role that algorithms play within 
the encryption/decryption process.57  Having established the importance 
of encryption to the DRM landscape, we must now briefly look at why 
these various encryption schemes come about.  This begs the question: 
If encrypting content is the industry standard for protecting that content 
from unauthorized users, and an encryption scheme’s effectiveness is 
gauged by the “strength” of its algorithm, how do cryptographers make 
these encryption algorithms “stronger”? 
2. Strength in Numbers 
As stated previously, the strength of DRM encryption schemes 
depend on the “strength” of their respective encryption algorithms.58  
An algorithm’s strength is derived from different factors including the 
length of time it would take a cracker to break the algorithm using a 
brute-force-attack59 or the algorithm’s susceptibility to cryptanalysis.60  
The most basic and obvious measure of an algorithm’s strength is the 
 
54.  VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 95.   
55.  Id.   
56.  Id.   
57. These are very basic, simple examples of the encryption/decryption process; 
however, the role of algorithms within the encryption process cannot be downplayed.  
Algorithms are crucial to the encryption process, and thus DRM as a whole.    
58.  VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 90. 
59.  A “cracker” is a general term used to describe someone who attempts to decrypt 
or otherwise circumvent the encryption protections on encrypted content.  A brute-force-
attempt is one example of measures used by crackers.  In this method, the cracker uses a 
program that runs through a massive list of letter and number combinations until the key is 
found.  See Brute-force Attack, COMPUTER HOPE (last viewed Jan. 29, 2012), 
http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/b/brutforc.htm.  This tactic is still very much in use 
today, as users of Sony’s Playstation Network discovered when 60,000 accounts were hacked 
using this very same method.  John Leyden, Sony network ransacked in huge brute-force 
attack, THE REGISTER (posted Oct. 12, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2011/10/12/playstation_network_brute_force_attack/. 
60.  VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 91–93. 
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algorithm’s key length.61  The key is the secret number necessary to 
decrypt the encrypted content; the longer the key, the more difficult it is 
to discover.62  If a key can be up to N digits, the total number of possible 
keys that it could be is 2 to the Nth power.63  Thus, a key length of 18 
returns 262,144 possible keys, only one of which works.  While key 
length is a general provision for determining the strength of an 
encryption algorithm, it should not be assumed that a longer key is 
automatically more impervious to cracking than a shorter key.  Keys can 
be broken merely by educated guess, finding patterns within the 
generated numbers,64 or even ignoring the encryption entirely and 
finding holes in other parts of the system.65  Thus, more complex 
algorithms, in effect, make it more difficult for a cracker to find patterns 
or guess the key to decrypt content.  Thus, not only is encryption 
dependent upon algorithms, but encryption’s livelihood hinges on its 
effectiveness, and its effectiveness depends, at least in part, on the 
strength of its encryption algorithm. 
B. The Industry Standard 
1. The Chain Rule 
Behind DRM’s forward line of troops—encryption algorithms, 
stands a second and equally complicated array of defenders—licensing 
agreements.66  Encryption and decryption of content requires a license 
of the relevant encryption technology.67  In order to completely protect 
digital content, every “link” of the “chain,” from content producer to 
consumer, must remain secure.  This is done through a complex set of 
licenses between encryption technology producers and digital content 
transmitting technology producers.68  The device connections between 
these links must be licensed with the proper encryption and decryption 
keys from the encryption producer.69  These links are more intricate 
than one may initially realize.  In theory, every link must maintain the 
 
61.  Id. 
62.  See VAN TASSEL, supra note 23, at 91. 
63.  Id.   
64.  Many cryptosystems involve random number generators, which can sometimes 
exhibit patterns.  Id. at 92.   
65.  Id. at 92–93. 
66.  As before with encryption, this is not meant to be all-inclusive, but rather a brief 
overview of licensing agreements. 
67.  Marks and Turnbull, supra note 22.   
68.  Id. at 13–24.   
69.  Id. 
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digital content’s encryption as the content is passed to the next link.70  
With this in mind, take the example of a consumer watching a 
legitimately purchased DVD.  The DVD itself must be encrypted, then 
the digital content contained therein decrypted by the DVD player, 
then re-encrypted by the DVD player as it travels through the DVD 
player’s memory to the output jacks,71 then finally decrypted within the 
ports connecting the output cables to the television.72  Unlicensed 
devices may transmit encrypted content, so long as they do not decrypt 
the content in doing so.73  The theory behind all of this encryption and 
decryption is that every link along the chain must be protected, lest a 
tech-savvy third party tap into the chain and copy un-encrypted digital 
content, thus circumventing the whole DRM system entirely.  
Standardizing DRM systems is a complex task, involving the 
intertwining interests of not just the content producers and end 
consumers, but also the computer, broadcasting, and 
telecommunications industries.74  This complex licensing-technology 
hybrid guarantees that, at least in theory, digital content moving from 
point A to point B, through any medium, will have some sort of 
protection from being copied, whether that content is on DVDs, digital 
downloaded music, or other types of digital content.75  “In order to be 
successful on the mass-market, DRM technologies have to be integrated 
into consumer devices in a standardized way . . . from the creation of 
content to its consumption by individual users, it must be assured that 
no single device or component can transmit the content in an 
unencrypted form, as this would compromise the security of the DRM 
 
70.  Id. at 11.  Marks and Turnbull describe the devices and services that “are capable 
of playing back, recording and/or transmitting” secure digital content as “way stations” that 
must maintain content as securely as it was received . . . [that further] may not pass content 
which has been legitimately decrypted through either analog or digital connections to other 
devices and systems without the appropriate protections.”  Id.   
71.  For examples of the types of technology used to transmit and/or store encrypted 
digital data, see Bechtold, supra note 15, at 326 n. 11 (“digital container”) and 327 (“Rights 
locker architectures”) n. 12 (describing a rights locker architectures with sources for further 
information).  As this paper deals primarily with encryption, expounding upon these in any 
further detail would prove irrelevant to its focus. 
72.  For a lengthy, fun example of a DVD’s encryption licensing agreement for DVD 
players, see “Advanced Access Content System (AACS) Adaptor agreement,” available at 
http://www.aacsla.com/license/AACS_Adopter_Agrmt_090605.pdf, or the plethora of other 
licensing agreements utilized by AACS, available at http://www.aacsla.com/license/. 
73.  Marks and Turnbull, supra note 22, at 11–13.  To do so would violate the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.  See infra section C. 
74.  Bechtold, supra note 15, at 330. 
75.  See generally Marks and Turnbull, supra note 22, at 12–25. 
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system.”76 
2. Sine on the Dotted Line 
In addition to these technological licensing agreements are usage 
contract licensing agreements.  Usage contracts tend to follow a similar 
pattern.77  This pattern is that, prior to accessing the content, a consumer 
must agree to certain rules limiting the extent of that consumer’s use of 
that content.  Usage contracts take various forms, from a standard 
“Terms of Service” agreement to “End User License Agreement[s]”.78  
Usage contracts provide another layer of protection for content 
producers and their licensees, as these contracts add one or more claims 
for breach of contract to circumventing or decrypting DRM protections.  
This adds the additional complication of breach of contract versus 
copyright infringement claims, actual damages versus disgorgement 
damages, and other issues that arise when a licensing agreement is 
breached.79 
3. The Prime Variable 
The slew of protections available to content producers does not end 
with contracts and the legal ramifications of breach of contract or 
breach of the licensing agreement.  The big guns in DRM’s arsenal, at 
least in regards to digital content that is copyrightable, is the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).80  The DMCA makes it not just a 
felony, but a very costly felony, to circumvent DRM protections on 
copyrighted material.81 
The DMCA prohibits the circumvention of “a technological 
measure that effectively prevents access to a [copyrighted work82].”83  
Furthermore, the DMCA also prohibits the importation, manufacture, 
 
76.  Bechtold, supra note 15, at 330.  
77.  See id. at 339. 
78.  Id. at 339–40. 
79.  See Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use 3–9 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished 
working paper, on file with the University of Chicago Institute for Law and Economics and 
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/534-obs-damages.pdf). 
80.  17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (hereinafter “DMCA”). 
81. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c) (detailing the hefty fines 
associated with circumvention in violation of the DMCA). 
82.  It is important to note that in order for the circumvention to be of the type 
prohibited by the DMCA, the underlying work must be copyrighted or copyrightable.  See 
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534–44 (6th Cir. 2004). 
83.  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
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trafficking, or distribution of such a technological measure.84  It is 
without question that most DRM encryptions would constitute a 
“technological device,”85 and therefore, decrypting them would 
constitute circumvention.86  It is important to remember that the DMCA 
itself only prohibits the access of copyrighted work through the process 
of circumvention of a technological measure to prevent such.87  So 
insofar as mere decryption of the encryption algorithms on copyrighted 
work is concerned, the DMCA, in conjunction with licensing 
agreements forbidding circumvention of DRM, gives real “teeth” to the 
punishments available for would-be encryption crackers.  If one were to 
decrypt the copyrighted content and thereafter distribute it somehow, 
then the double-whammy of violation of the DMCA and copyright 
infringement would be available remedies. 
It is important to reiterate that the first link in the complex DRM 
technology and legal chain is encryption.  Encryption is the crucial 
technology upon which the elaborate DRM system rests.  Without 
encryption, a tech-savvy consumer would be able to access unprotected 
digital content and do whatever he wishes with that content, be it copy 
it, distribute it, or any of the other habits legally delegated to copyright 
holders and their respective licensees.88  Encryption, as stated 
previously, is a heavily math-based science, implemented solely through 
algorithms.  It is encryption’s necessity to the DRM system as a whole 
that makes it so important.  It is its complexity that makes it relevant.  
But it is this same complexity that presents issues for DRM patent-
holders in the post-Bilski patent world.  It is with this in mind that one 
must next look at the issues of patentability in regards to DRM. 
III. THE PATENT-DRM CONUNDRUM 
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter that can be 
patented as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof 
 
84.  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006). 
85.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B).  (“[A] technological measure ‘effectively controls 
access to a work’ if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the 
application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright 
owner, to gain access to the work.”) 
86.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (“[T]o ‘circumvent a technological measure’ means 
to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, 
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright 
owner.”) (emphasis added). 
87.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
88.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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. . .”89 Supreme Court precedent has determined that such an expansive 
term (“any”) indicated that Congress contemplated that patent subject 
matter would be broad in scope, and that “ingenuity should receive a 
liberal encouragement.”90  Section 100(b) defines a “process” as “a new 
use of a process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.”91  There are three specific exceptions to the otherwise broad 
patentable subject matter: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.”92  But precedent on the matter has not been consistent 
or particularly understandable. 
A. Knowledge and Not On Numbers93 
The courts have historically struggled with the limits of patentability 
in this context.  The difficulty has been determining whether inventions 
incorporating algorithms are within patent’s bounds, or alternatively, 
fall into the exceptions to patentable subject matter and are thus non-
patentable.  The waxing and waning of the courts’ willingness to 
broaden or constrict patent’s scope in this regard has been tumultuous, 
and opinions have been less than consistent and strayed from 
hammering out any bright-line rules.  What is an interesting point of 
guidance are the various tests implemented by the courts, and the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to formally adopt any of them.  A brief 
examination of these decisions will show not just what was and became 
at stake in the ultimate question of patentability of algorithmic 
technology, but will also show the conflicting precedents available to the 
Bilski Court, as well as the back-and-forth between the federal courts 
and the Supreme Court. 
1. Arithmus ex Machina 
In Gottschalk v. Benson,94 the United States Supreme Court 
examined a patent application involving claims as to a method for 
converting binary-coded-decimal numerals into pure binary numerals 
on any general-purpose computer.95  The Court, in its determination, 
 
89.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
90.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).  
91.  35 U.S.C. §100(b) (2006).  
92.  Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309.   
93.  THOMAS BENFIELD HARBOTTLE,  DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (CLASSICAL) 
373 (2d ed. 1958) (Plato is quoted as having said “a good decision is based on knowledge and 
not on numbers.”). 
94.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
95.  Id at 64. 
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discussed the very issue of patentability of the algorithm involved,96 
finding that algorithms should be considered with the same scrutiny and 
wariness as other “phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts,” explaining that such are 
“the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”97  The Court found 
that this abstract idea (the algorithm), tied with no machine in particular 
(in this case, any general computer), would pre-empt the mathematical 
formula and be a patent on the algorithm itself.98  Interestingly, the 
Court in finding this determination briefly touched on language that 
would be a motif in the patentability struggle.  The Court said that 
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or 
thing’” is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not 
include particular machines.”99  This language would echo around the 
debate for the next thirty years.  The Court had thus given some clarity 
as to what was not patentable, in this case an algorithm for converting 
numbers from one form to another, and categorized that algorithm as 
being within the exceptions to patentability, but gave no concrete 
definition for “abstract,” “phenomena of nature,” or any of the like. 
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) 
used this guidance in In re Chatfield.100  While being careful to not be too 
focused on the term “algorithm,”101 the court found that a method for 
improving the operating efficiency of a computing system containing a 
mathematical equation was not, in its entirety, non-patentable, merely 
because a portion of the claim is a non-patentable algorithm.102  The 
court also held that the prior argument that a “process patent must 
either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to 
change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing’” was not 
determinative.103 
The Supreme Court contributed some clarity on the subject with its 
ruling in Parker v. Flook.104  In Flook, a case involving a claim in which 
 
96.  Id. at 64–67. 
97.  Id. at 67. 
98.  Id. at 70. 
99.  Id. 
100.  In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A 1976). 
101.  Id. at 156 n.5.  “Over-concentration on the word ‘algorithm’ alone, for example, 
may mislead . . . . It would be unnecessarily detrimental to our patent system to deny 
inventors patent protection on the sole ground that their contribution could be broadly 
termed an “algorithm.” 
102.  See id. at 157–58. 
103.  Id. at 156 n.4 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)). 
104.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
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the only novel part of the claim was an algorithm,105 the Court reiterated 
the unpatentability of mathematical formulae, despite post-solution 
applications, as an algorithm constitutes a “law of nature.”106  Citing its 
holding in Benson, the Court, yet again, covered the general rule of 
unpatentability of abstract principles,107 and again mentioned, without 
holding determinative, what would become the machine-or-
transformation test for determining process invention patentability.108  
The Court also remarked that while the subject matter as a whole must 
be considered,109 “if a claim is directed essentially to a method of 
calculating, using mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a 
specific purpose, the claimed method is nonstatutory.”110 
2. “As a Whole” 
In 1981, the Supreme Court backtracked a bit, in its ruling in 
Diamond v. Diehr,111 a case involving a claim for a process for curing 
raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured products.112  The claim 
involved an algorithm, and while it involved a computer, the Court 
found that aspect not determinative as to its patentability.113  Rather, the 
Court found, oddly enough, that taken “as a whole,”114 and considering 
the “novelty of the combination they represent[],”115 it was worthy of 
patent protection, “even though some or all of its elements are not 
‘novel.’”116  This was despite the fact that the only novel part of the claim 
was the steps invoking the algorithm, and the algorithm itself.117  
Furthermore, the Court argued, dissecting the claims into old and new 
elements in such a way as done in Flook would render all inventions 
 
105.  See id. at 591 (“The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must 
be new and useful.”). 
106.  Id. at 589. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. at 588 n.9 (“An argument can be made, however, that this Court has only 
recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular 
apparatus or operated to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.’”). 
109.  Id. at 594. 
110.  Id. at 595 (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 2030 (1977)). 
111.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. at 181.   
114.  Id. at 188. 
115.  Id. at 193 n. 15 (quoting Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 
340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)). 
116.  Id. n. 15.  
117.  See id. at 192–93. 
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non-patentable.118  In a scathing dissent, Justice Stevens points out the 
obvious discrepancies between this holding and the decisions in Flook119 
and Benson.120  Justice Stevens pointed out that the only novel part of 
the claim was the algorithm121, and that the process as a whole, as the 
majority stated, was not novel, in that the algorithm was applied to a 
computer to determine the amount of time that the rubber molding 
press should remain closed during the rubber-curing process.122  It is with 
this decision that we see the paradigm shift towards a broader patent 
scope for algorithm-implemented inventions, possibly from the 
reasoning in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,123 which gave the legislative 
intent to grant patent protection for “anything under the sun that is 
made by man.”124  Of course, the issue here is whether a new algorithm 
applied to a non-novel claim constituted something “made by man.”125 
3. A Slippery Slope 
Yet again, the scope was broadened in the landmark cases In re 
Alappat126 and State Street Bank,127  the latter of which is attributed as 
being the catalyst for the “patent boom” that still continues.128  Alappat’s 
invention involved a “rasterizer”129 that performed the same overall 
function as prior art rasterizers; however, it did so “in a different way” 
thanks to the implementation of the new algorithm.130  The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit cited the struggle the Supreme Court 
has had in pinning down and articulating a rule for mathematical subject 
 
118.  Id. at 189 n. 12. 
119.  Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
120.  Id. at 201–02. 
121.  Id. at 208 (“[T]he only difference between the conventional methods of operating 
a molding press and that claimed in the application rests in those steps of the claims which 
[sic] relate to the calculation incident to the solution of the mathematical problem or formula 
used to control [the heating process].”). 
122.  See id. at 208–09. 
123.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
124.  Id. at 309 (citing S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Congress., 2d Sess., 5 (1952)). 
125.  I think it is safe to assume that it is “under the sun.” 
126.  In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
127.  State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (hereinafter “State Street”). 
128.  Lori E. Lesser, We’ve Got Algorithm – Software Patents Boom, FINDLAW, 
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Aug/1/130894.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).  
129.  Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1537 (The court itself summarizes  what Alappat’s particular 
invention did: “in lay terms, the invention is an improvement in an oscilloscope comparable 
to a TV having a clearer picture.”); id. at 1538 (The term “rasterizer” is a machine used 
specifically in claim 15.). 
130.  Id. at 1540–1542. 
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matter,131 and found that the claim produced a “useful, concrete, and 
tangible result” that was “not so ‘abstract and sweeping’ that it would 
‘wholly pre-empt’ the use of any apparatus employing the combination 
of mathematical calculations recited therein.”132  Essentially, this 
overturned the previous rulings that held software non-patentable, 
provided that it physically transformed the underlying subject matter.133  
This ruling cracked open the door to software patents even more, as the 
court found that a contrary ruling would render computers operating 
pursuant to software “may represent patentable subject matter, 
provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the 
other requirements of Title 35.”134 
State Street opened the floodgates to software patenting.  Reiterating 
this “useful, concrete and tangible result,” language in Allapat, the court 
in State Street found section 101’s bounds to be broad.135  The court 
supported this contention by finding that the “repetitive use of the 
expansive term ‘any’ in §101 shows Congress’s intent not to place any 
restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained 
beyond those specifically recited in §101.”136  It was with this mindset 
that the court tackled the issue presented before it, which was one for a 
data processing system for implementing various aspects of 
administering investments for a mutual funds administrator.137  The 
court found that the Freeman-Walter-Abele138 test, as applied by the 
district court, was improper for determining the patentability of the data 
processing system.139  The court argued that the test was misleading, 
because a patent claim “employing a law of nature, natural 
phenomenon, or abstract idea is patentable subject matter even though 
[the exceptions listed] would not, by [themselves] be entitled to such 
 
131.  Id. at 1543. 
132.  Id. at 1544 (quoting Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68–72 (1972)). 
133.  Id. at 1543. 
134.  Id. at l545. 
135.  State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (1998).  
136.  Id.  The court also cited the Supreme Court’s own words in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), that Congress intended §101 to cover “anything under 
the sun that is made by man.”  Id. 
137.  See id. at 1370. 
138.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958–59 (Fed. Cir. 2008); State Street, 149 F.3d at 
1374–75 (This test is only mentioned in passing, for the sake of brevity.  To delve further into 
it would go outside of the necessities of this Comment.  Plus, the court in In re Bilski and State 
Street did away with this test, thus making it a non-issue in any further determination on 
encryption patentability.). 
139.  State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373–74.   
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protection.”140  This circular argument applies also to algorithms, the 
court explains.141  This, the court reasons, follows from the new rule after 
Diehr and Alappat, and under that rule, the claim is still patentable 
subject matter if the claim produces “a useful, concrete and tangible 
result.”142  Thus, the court concludes, the transformation of data, for 
example, through an algorithm, produces a “useful, concrete and 
tangible result,”143 regardless of the physical requirements stated in 
Alappat.144 
The result of this decision was a “land rush mentality” of patent 
applications, which swarmed the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
and Federal Circuit.145  What followed was an “endless rush” of patents, 
from the mundane to the complex.146  This overload has since 
overburdened the PTO, a warning prophesized long ago by Justice 
Stevens in his dissent in Diehr as reasoning for limiting the scope of 
patentability for process claims incorporating abstract ideas.147  
Regardless, the culmination of these decisions presented a broad area of 
patentability for an already overburdened patent office, finding 
difficulty in keeping up with the demands of the growing digital 
revolution.148 
Thus the courts have had difficulty defining precisely where to draw 
the line on patent claims involving algorithms.  Though, this is not to say 
that some clarity cannot be gleaned from the reaping in this area.  There 
exists the machine-or-transformation test, slowly defined throughout 
this era to mean that a process claim that involves an abstract idea, such 
as an algorithm, is patentable if it either is tied to a particular machine 
or apparatus, or transforms material from one state to another.  
Alternatively, one could look at the holdings in Alappat and State Street 
and look at the patent claims as a whole, and see if it produces 
something that would be considered “useful, concrete, and tangible.”149 
 
140.  Id. at 1374. 
141.  Id. 
142.  See id. (citing In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
143.  Id. at 1373. 
144.  See Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526 
145.  Jay Dratler, Jr., Article: Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 299, 303 (2005). 
146.  See id. 
147.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
148.  Martha Groves, A Patent Dispute; Lawsuit Raises a Hot Issue in Exploding 
Technology, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at D1. 
149.  Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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4. A Solution? 
It was with this multicolored backdrop that Bernard Bilski entered 
the patent arena.  In the 1990s, Bilski developed a method for using 
hedge contracts to reduce the risk that a commodity’s wholesale price 
might change, and applied for a patent.150  Bilski’s patent application was 
rejected in September 2006, as the claimed method was ruled to be 
merely an abstract idea by the Patent Examiner at the USPTO, and 
Bilski appealed to the Federal Circuit in early 2007.151 
The Federal Circuit handed down its ruling on October 30, 2008, in 
In re Bilski.152  In this decision, the Federal Circuit, seeing the numerous 
tests and commentary on the issue, decided to adopt the machine-or-
transformation test as the sole means for testing the patentability of a 
process claim.153  The court reconciled the conflicting commentary by 
finding that this test could explain the finding in the Supreme Court’s 
holdings.154  The court then systematically examined and rejected the 
remaining tests for patentability, ultimately concluding that the 
machine-or-transformation test was the best, and only test to be 
applied.155 
What this long romp through the case law history has shown is the 
difficulty and frustration experienced by the courts in finding an 
appropriate means for determining the patentability of claims involving 
abstract subject matter.  The machine-or-transformation test was a 
conclusion reached out of necessity by the Federal Circuit.  The need 
for some kind of ultimate test seemed necessary to not only curb the 
growing number of patent applications and relieve some of the burden 
on the USPTO156 and Federal Circuit that resulted from State Street, but 
also to prevent the stymieing of progress by overbroad patent claims 
and patent trolls.157  Arguably, this rationale proved successful.  From 
 
150. Steven Seidenberg, Bilski’s Battle, INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 20, 2007), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2007/10/01/bilskis-battle. 
151.  Id. 
152.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
153.  Id. at 956. 
154.  See id. at 956 (applying the test to decisions in Benson and Flook); see id. at 957 
(applying the test to Diehr). 
155.  Id. at 956–64. 
156.  See generally Kevin Coughlin, “Technology Upends the Meaning of Invention 
Patent Requests Shift to Ideas, Know-How,” THE STAR LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Mar. 12, 
2000, at 1. 
157.  And was successful.  See Austin Modine, “US Court Blocks Amazon-style Patent 
Trolls,” The Register, (Oct. 31, 2008),  http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2008/10/31/us_court_of_appeals_federal_circuit_business_method_patent_decision/. 
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October 30, 2008 (the date of the Bilski holding) until March 8, 2010, 
out of the 140 cases to the Board dealing with, inter alia, a section 101 
rejection, the Board held that a claim was non-statutory subject matter 
78.3% of the time.158  Maybe the USPTO and interested onlookers had 
finally gotten some respite. 
B. What the Circuit Giveth, the Supreme Court Taketh Away 
1. Division of the Issues 
The sigh of relief would not echo long, however.  When the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in July 2009, the arena was set. . . the fighters in 
their corners, and the peasants had gathered round to cheer for their 
respective champion.  Whether Bernard Bilski was a hero or a villain 
depended on which side of the aisle one sat.  Some saw him as 
continuing the status quo of the broad patent regime, while others 
simply saw him as an inventor trying to protect his creation.  Regardless, 
the case was the culmination of decades of debate and frustration, and 
the Intellectual Property world was watching. 
What they got instead, on June 28th, 2010, in Bilski v. Kappos,159 was 
something of a letdown.  Despite In re Bilski’s comprising a colossal 72 
pages (including multiple dissents), the Supreme Court decided the 
complex issue in as few as 41 pages.160  The Court held that while the 
machine-or-transformation test is “useful” and “important” and “an 
investigative tool” for determining process claims’ patentability, it “is 
not the sole test.”161  Further, the Supreme Court ruled that business 
method patents were abstract,162 and thus not patentable.163  While this 
answered an important question in the debate, namely the patentability 
of algorithmic business method patents, it failed to give any clarity on 
arguably the biggest issue in the debate—the patentability of other 
algorithm-dependant processes, such as software and encryption 
schemes.  The Supreme Court thus ruined yet another attempt by the 
lower courts to not only ease the patent workload for themselves and 
the USPTO, but also ruined another attempt by the Federal Circuit to 
prevent patent abuse and alleviate the alleged burden on innovation by 
 
158.  Peter Ludwig, Machine-or-Transformation Test Hits the Board: Patent-Eligible 
Subject Matter Following Bilski, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 139, 141 (2010). 
159.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
160.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
161.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (emphasis added). 
162.  Id. at 3231. 
163.  Id. 
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overbroad patent drafting. 
2. Remainder Questions 
One takeaway is that DRM might be in better standing had the 
Federal Circuit’s ruling won out.  Clearly, the machine-or-
transformation test presents a tougher standard, and one that an 
algorithm-specific technology might not have been able to overcome.  
Some DRM encryption schemes and distribution processes are not 
restricted to one machine or apparatus,164 and does the encryption and 
subsequent decryption of digital content really “transform material from 
one form to another?”  It is a tough question to answer.  In Grams, the 
court found that the algorithm involved “[did] not change any aspect of 
the physical process” of the material present.165  This begs the question 
as to whether encryption itself changes the physical aspect of the data, 
merely by scrambling it and rendering it unreadable. 
The issue regarding DRM encryption is not necessarily the rejection 
of the machine-or-transformation test, itself; rather, it is the damaging 
commentary in Bilski v. Kappos that endangers DRM encryption’s 
survival.  “Rather than adopting categorical rules166 that might have 
wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case 
narrowly on the basis of this Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and 
Diehr. . . .”167  The Court reiterated the three exceptions to section 101’s 
patentability principles, those being “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”168  There is an unavoidable similarity 
between Benson and DRM encryption, and the Court’s reverence to the 
former calls the patentability of the latter into question.  In Benson, the 
Court observed a patent on a process for converting numerals to pure 
binary numerals would have, in effect, been a patent on the 
algorithm/formula itself.169  It stands to reason then, that given 
encryption’s very function—the transformation of digital content to 
unreadable content, and back to digital content— the Court’s deference 
to Benson might call into question encryption’s patentability.  The 
Board often states that a claim fails to transform a particular article 
 
164.  Take for example, encryption on eBook files, which are readable on a computer, 
an eBook reader, a cell phone, or a tablet device. 
165.  In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). 
166.  Oh God forbid such a thing! 
167.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010). 
168.  Id. at 3225. 
169.  Id. at 3230. 
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because the data does not represent “physical” and “tangible” objects.170  
This also directly clashes with the chance of the machine-or-
transformation test saving encryption from falling outside of section 
101’s bounds.  The Court also cites Flook, describing the claim therein 
as containing nothing novel or innovative, save “reliance on a 
mathematical algorithm.”171  Taking this into consideration, it seems 
likely that DRM encryption schemes, which are novel only insofar as 
they contain new, “stronger” algorithms,172 would likely be non-
patentable subject matter, too.  The Court finally accredited Diehr with 
its determination that business method claims are non-patentable.173  
There is no guarantee that the reasoning in Diehr will prove successful 
with DRM encryption schemes either, as it is a point of debate as to 
whether the claim in Diehr was ruled patentable simply because it 
involved an industrial process, or because it transformed matter from 
one form to another, as the decision is not entirely clear.  Even 
considering DRM encryption “as a whole,” per the lesson learned in 
Diehr and stated in Bilski, it is unlikely that, given the surrounding prior 
art and major role that the algorithms play in encryption, it will pass 
patent muster.  Thus, DRM exists in a kind of grey area, not clearly 
qualifying for any of the numerous tests passed down through the 
precedent.  Of course, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to clarify 
anything on the matter only further complicates the debate. 
The difficulty really lies in meting out just “how much” of a role the 
algorithm may play in a patentable claim, given the numerous tests 
available.  Indeed, the USPTO itself needed help in determining how to 
approach this issue in Bilski’s wake.174  In the case of DRM encryption 
schemes, none of these tests really seem to pass.  Is it a “useful, concrete 
and tangible result”175 to encrypt and/or decrypt digital content?  Does 
encryption’s act of encrypting data “transform” it from one state to 
another?176  Must encryption be tied to a particular machine?177  Finally, 
 
170.  Ludwig, supra note 158, at 154. 
171.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978)). 
172.  See supra Section A(2). 
173.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230. 
174.  Ryan Paul, As USPTO evaluates Bilski, Red Hat says end software patents, ARS 
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/09/as-uspto-evaluates-bilski-ruling-
red-hat-says-end-software-patents.ars?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign= 
rss (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).   
175.  State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
176.  Per the second prong of the “machine-or-transformation” test. 
177.  Per the first prong of the “machine-or-transformation” test. 
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where do the encryption algorithms fit into the equation, and, if they are 
the only novel part of an encryption device, does that render the 
remainder of the application unpatentable?  Will DRM encryption 
survive in a post-Bilski world? 
IV.  SOLVING THE EQUATION 
The first step to solving this problem lies in the term “algorithm.”  In 
Benson, “algorithm” was defined as “a procedure for solving a given 
type of mathematical problem,”178 a definition echoed in Flook179 and 
Diehr.180  This definition creates a paradox.  Algorithms, by their very 
nature as problem solvers,181 are useful and have application 
somewhere,182 thus meeting the criteria in State Street.183  In spite of that, 
the Court has said time and time again that algorithms are abstract 
ideas, and thus outside of patent bounds.184 
One solution is that the Supreme Court should either re-define 
“algorithm,” to expressly state what types of algorithms are not 
patentable, or it should just do away with the algorithm exception 
altogether.  The former would present a circular problem of defining 
what types of “former” algorithms are abstract, thus warranting the 
“new” “algorithm” label within statutory limits.  This could be more of a 
problem than it is worth, having expert witnesses and lengthy briefs 
explaining why one algorithm is “newer” than another algorithm, ad 
infinitum.  Doing away with the notion that algorithms themselves are 
considered “abstract” would be doable if algorithms themselves were 
not patentable within larger claims, regardless of the surrounding prior 
art.  Ultimately, there must be some ruling as to whether algorithms’ 
role has changed in society, and whether they are now unique creations, 
worthy of patentability,185 or whether they still remain “abstract” natural 
 
178.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). 
179.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978). 
180.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981). 
181.  Per the definitions provided by Benson, Flook, and Diehr, supra notes 178–80. 
182.  Allen Clark Zoracki, When is an Algorithm Invented?  The Need for a New 
Paradigm for Evaluating an Algorithm for Intellectual Property Protection, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 579, 590 (2005) (hereafter “Zoracki Article”). 
183.  State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
184.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010). 
185.  This may be a question more appropriately answered by a more engineering-
oriented mind, as engineers with whom I have spoken have unanimously echoed the 
sentiment that a complicated algorithm applied to a useful function is itself creative and 
useful enough to warrant a patent. 
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phenomena. 
Another option would be to cave into the open source demands186 
and do away with software patenting, and thus encryption patenting, 
altogether.  Proponents for such argue that information is “the oxygen 
of the modern age,” and thus needs to be free.187  They argue that 
software and other information products do not provide any new 
information to the public, and thus a patent bargain, traditionally a 
“bargain” between the patentee and the public, presents a one-sided 
bargain.188  Further, copyright protection exists for some software code 
as well,189 so it could be argued that encryption algorithms fall within the 
realm of copyrights.  This is the best method of achieving the ultimate 
goals of intellectual property law, believes prominent IP scholar Mark 
Lemley, giving it as little protection as possible.190  Others argue that 
DRM may render traditional copyright laws completely irrelevant.191 
V. CONCLUSION 
Aside from an act of Congress further limiting or expanding the 
current scope of section 101, there are limited options for the courts in 
determining whether encryption schemes are patentable or not, and if 
not, what remedy exists to allow them to be, if necessary.  If they are 
patentable, then the problem is what role algorithms play, and where to 
draw the line in regards to determining what constitutes a “novel” 
algorithm or an old, unpatentable algorithm.  If they are not patentable, 
then the DRM industry is done for, or had better lobby for some 
contrary legislation.  While there is no easy fix, as evidenced by, if 
nothing else, thirty years of arguing over the subject, it is clear that 
something must be done.  Patent law is simply falling behind the 
technology it was intended to protect, which could prove very hazardous 
with the digital age screaming onward at breakneck speed.  In regards to 
DRM encryption, a failure to do so could prove fatal to the DRM 
 
186. See Paul, supra note 174. 
187. Kristen Osenga, Information May Want to be Free, but Information Products do 
not: Protecting and Facilitating Transactions in Information Products, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2099, 2100 (2009).   
188.  Id. at 2106–07. 
189.  Id. at 2107.   
190.  Gary Miller, On Federal Preemption of Contractual First Sale Waivers, BOSTON 
COLLEGE INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM 1 (Sept. 23, 2010), http://bciptf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/2-ON-FEDERAL-PREEMPTION-OF-CONTRACTUAL-FIRST-
SALE-WAIVERS.pdf.  
191.  Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1223 
(2000).    
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industry, for without patents to provide legal protections for licensing 
the encryption keys and devices, what incentive is there to produce 
them at all?  This could have disastrous effects on not only the DRM 
industry, but also the various media and content outlets that rely upon 
that industry, which would be unable to protect digital content from 
unauthorized access and distribution.  This danger is not limited to 
digital content providers, but also those who use encryption to buy and 
sell online, create digital signatures, and send confidential or sensitive 
information on secure networks.  While mathematics might be “God-
given,” or naturally occurring phenomena, algorithms must lie 
somewhere between the human and the divine, and the courts must 
draw this line closer towards the former, or else risk bringing down the 
whole system.  As the world continues to shrink, the need to protect 
information will continue to expand, and the role of DRM will become 
more and more important.  Let us hope that for once law can match 
pace with technology. 
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